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Economic theory had long held that when unemployment rates are low,
wage pressure increases and inflation soon follows. But the current state
of the American economy—low unemployment and low inflation—
seems to indicate that economists are wrong. Research Associate Barry
Bluestone and Stephen Rose, of the Educational Testing Service, argue
that the problem is not the theory but the method used to measure 
labor supply.
The unemployment rate is the traditional measure used by economists
and policymakers to determine the tightness of the labor supply—the
lower the rate, the tighter the labor market. Bluestone and Rose assert
that a better measure of labor supply is the number of hours that people
work. Others have taken this same approach, but the authors find that
some measures of hours worked, such as the Current Population Survey,
have not been entirely accurate. Using data from 1967 to 1989 that were
collected by the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income
Dynamics and controlling for the effects of the business cycle, Bluestone
and Rose find that Americans are working more hours now than they
were two decades ago. At the same time their continuity of employment
and connection to a long-term employer have decreased. This increased
job instability and stagnating wages have made Americans willing to
work extra hours and extra jobs at their current pay rate in order to build
up nest eggs as protection against possible unemployment in the future.
This is true not only for individual workers, but also for families in which
both husband and wife work. By 1988 prime-age working couples were
putting in an average of 3,450 hours per year in combined employment,
up from 2,850 hours two decades before. Bluestone and Rose find, how-
ever, that families are experiencing only modest income gains from their
additional labor. For prime-age working couples as a group the increased
work hours produced an increase of only slightly more than 1 percent per
year from 1973 to 1988 in their material standard of living.
Bluestone and Rose conclude that it is unlikely that the current low
unemployment rate will result in inflation because the labor market is
not as tight as the unemployment statistics indicate. Current workers
make up a largely unmeasured source of labor. Since they appear quite
May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 3willing to take on additional work, employers are in little danger of fac-
ing labor shortages. The authors see no sign of abatement in factors that
contribute to worker insecurity—current trends in global competition,
technological change, weakened labor unions, and industry deregulation.
Therefore, the upward trend in hours worked is likely to continue, and
this means that economic growth can continue without risk of inflation. 
May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 4Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Preface
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Growth in Work Hours
Barry Bluestone and Stephen Rose  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
About the Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C o n t e n t s
May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 5As of April 1998 the official unemployment rate was at its lowest point
since Febru a ry 1970—running at 4.3 percent. With the rate that low,
this should have been a good year for those seeking employment, includ-
ing many former welfare recipients. At the same time, it should have
been a worrisome year for those concerned that low unemployment will
result in tight labor markets, leading to upward wage pressures and thus
to inflation. But the reality is that employers have not been experienc-
ing a shortage of labor and have not felt the pressure to raise wages as
might be expected.
Despite this incongruity between the official statistics, inflation rates,
and the apparent state of labor markets, many policymakers, especially
members of the Federal Reserve Board, continue to have faith in a tenet
of economics that says that the economy cannot experience low unem-
ployment and low inflation simultaneously. Each time the unemploy-
ment figures show a decrease, discussion turns toward policies that
would slow the economy and reduce employment opportunities. 
The belief that the official unemployment statistics reflect the tru e
d e g ree of tightness of the labor market is used to buttress the push to
reduce welfare expenditures by requiring that more recipients get a job. If
jobs are plentiful, welfare recipients ought to be able to find one. Barry
Bluestone and Stephen Rose take a close look at the American worker
and argue that the reality does not match the official unemployment sta-
tistics. Despite the low official unemployment rate the labor market is
not tight because already employed workers are working more hours and
at their current wage rates as the demand for labor expands. Corporate
downsizing and the massive layoffs that resulted are fresh in the minds of
American workers and they fear losing their job. This insecurity makes
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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them reluctant to ask for wage increases and leads many to work extra
hours to build a financial cushion. The employment picture is not much
better for prospective workers. Welfare recipients seeking work are find-
ing that jobs are not plentiful; employers can hire from a pool of current
workers, many of whom have more experience than the unemployed
welfare recipients.
If the picture painted by Bluestone and Rose is much closer to the true
situation than that indicated by official unemployment rates, then, as
they argue, the debate that has preoccupied policymakers re g a rd i n g
whether or not the economy should be slowed to prevent inflation
becomes meaningless. It is difficult to say at this point whether or not
t h e re can be both low unemployment and low inflation for a longer
extended period because the labor market is not yet tight enough to
cause any wage pre s s u re. What is known, according to Bluestone and
Rose, is that the current labor market does not justify policies that will
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By April 1998 the official unemployment rate re p o rted by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) was 4.3 percent, the lowest rate since
F e b ru a ry 1970. Not since the era of President Richard Nixon had the
jobless rate been this low. The BLS also re p o rted that unemployment
had remained at or below 5 percent for 13 months running. Not long ago
most economists would have considered such an unemployment record
impossible to achieve, or at least impossible without igniting an 
explosive cycle of wage-led inflation. Yet prices have remained under
control. During the past three years the consumer price index has risen
only 2.6 percent a year—less than half the average annual inflation rate
of the 1980s. More o v e r, instead of accelerating as the jobless rate
dropped, monthly price increases in 1997 were smaller than in the pre-
ceding year. In the first quarter of 1997, when the economy was growing
at a red-hot 4.9 percent annual rate, inflation was trending downward
toward 2.3 percent. 
Such a sanguine unemployment-inflation environment has forc e d
economists back to the drawing boards to try to figure out why re a l i t y
has seemingly so conspicuously trumped economic theory. As Steven
Pearlstein (1997) re p o rts, “A decade ago, if you’d predicted [this] kind
of economic development, many economists and business leaders
would have laughed.” Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan
G reenspan, in his biennial re p o rt to Congress in July 1997, pro c l a i m e d
that the current state of the economy was superb. He conceded that,
despite the official low unemployment rate, there were no signs of
inflation on the horizon. 
Many business writers have been forced to abandon the old orthodoxy
and talk of a “new paradigm” in which rising inflation is no longer set off
The Growth in Work Hours
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by unemployment rates as low as 5 percent. Since this is uncharted 
territory, no one knows how low the unemployment rate can go and still
not cause prices to rise. Is it 4.5 percent? Or 4.2 percent? Or perh a p s
even 4.0 percent? Some analysts have noted that some states and
regional labor markets have maintained local unemployment rates of 4
percent or less without any signs of upward wage pressures. 
T h e re is no end to speculation about the causes of this new benign 
economic climate. Improved productivity, particularly in manufacturing,
is given credit for helping to keep a lid on prices. Output per hour in the
goods-producing sector has been growing at nearly 3 percent a year since
1989—a level nearly half again as large as during the 1970s and equal to
the rate during the “golden years” of the 1960s. This has helped contain
costs in many industries. In some industries prices are even falling.1 A
decline in transportation costs is another factor. While freight volume
continues to grow, its cost as a percentage of GDP has fallen from about
7 percent in 1990 to under 6 percent today. This is due in part to the
rapid diffusion of high-tech equipment throughout transportation indus-
tries. The use of electronic scanners for tracking shipments and of more
f u e l - e fficient trucks, locomotives, and aircraft has reduced the cost of
transporting goods and thereby the final cost of producing and distribut-
ing them (Matthews 1997). 
Most surprisingly, other services (outside of transportation) are doing
their part in keeping prices down. Until recently economists believed
that service sector price increases were inevitable because of “Baumol’s
disease,” a re f e rence to the theoretical work of New York University
economist William Baumol. In the 1960s Baumol (1967) postulated that
the rate of inflation would tend to increase over time as the economy
moved into the postindustrial age and services became a larger part of
national output. This increase would occur because services, unlike 
manufacturing, are essentially labor intensive and presumably cannot
count on automation to boost prod u c t i v i t y. After all, how can anyone
boost the efficiency with which the New York Philharmonic plays
Beethoven’s Ninth? 
Today the “cost disease” in such sectors as health care, education, and
even legal services is proving susceptible to treatment, if not cure, by
new medical and educational technologies and by information technolo-
gies more generally. The inflation rates for housing, medical care, 
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in the nonenergy services sector as a whole rose by only 2.3 percent in
1996. By comparison, the lowest rate of increase at any time during the
1980s was 4.7 percent. Michael Mandel (1997b) reports that nearly 70
p e rcent of the entire drop in inflation since 1986 has come from ser-
vices, a rather startling finding given that manufacturing is usually 
credited with keeping inflation at bay.
All of these factors clearly play a role in creating the present low-
unemployment–low-inflation environment. But we believe there is
something much deeper at work. It has to do with how the expansion of
global markets, the deregulation of key industries, the weakening of
labor unions, and corporate downsizing have fundamentally changed the
structure of labor supply. These factors have generated a greater sense of
job insecurity and stagnating or, in many cases, declining family income.
Even Alan Greenspan has alluded to this phenomenon, suggesting that
prices have been held in check because workers have forgone wage hikes
for job security and unions have increasingly pledged themselves to five-
and six-year contracts in an attempt to lock in job security at the
expense of higher wages (Greenspan 1996). 
We think that the Federal Reserve chairman is largely correct; job inse-
curity is a critical factor, often overlooked in the past. But the mecha-
nism that links job insecurity (and stagnating incomes) to price stability
has less to do with union contracts than with a fundamental shift in the
n a t i o n ’s “labor supply regime.” This policy brief will present evidence
that increased job insecurity and stagnating incomes have kept inflation
in check by creating a situation in which an increase in the demand for
labor as the economy expands is met by an increase in the supply of
labor f rom incumbent workers, that is, from workers who are alre a d y
employed. The key point is that in this new labor supply regime Say’s
venerable law, “Supply creates its own demand,” has been turned on its
head to become “Increased demand creates its own supply.” In the face of
heightened job insecurity and declining income, workers now toil as
many hours as possible when jobs are plentiful in anticipation of down-
sizing and job loss—and they do so at existing wage rates. More o v e r,
declining hourly wage rates, even in the absence of job insecurity, have
forced millions of families to increase their combined hours of work sim-
ply to maintain their annual income. This relieves a significant labor supply
constraint that normally accompanies low official unemployment rates.
The Growth in Work Hours
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Instead of having to raise wages to attract more workers, firms have
increasingly been able to fill their additional need for labor by employing
their own workers longer or by offering second jobs to workers who are
employed elsewhere. This is far different from the labor supply regime of
the 1970s in which economic growth depended much more on coaxing
additional workers into the labor force—a practice that historically had
required offering higher wages. 
Significant policy implications follow from these findings. This new
source of labor supply has essentially dampened inflationary pressure in
the overall economy, permitting the economy to grow at rates not for-
merly considered feasible. Unemployment rates below 5 perc e n t — p e r-
haps even in the 4 percent range—can be maintained without serious
inflation. Because official unemployment statistics do not reveal the
increase in hours worked by incumbent workers and thus do not detect a
shift in the labor supply, the Federal Reserve Board should shy away from
a c c o rding much weight to such statistics in setting monetary policy.
Until workers realize significantly higher hourly pay rates and experience
g reater employment security, the upward trend in weekly and annual
work hours is likely to continue, sustaining the benign unemployment-
inflation environment. 
This brief has four sections. First, we review the logic and original evi-
dence for the Phillip’s curve and for the NAIRU (the nonaccelerating-
inflation rate of unemployment)—the conventional explanations for the
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In the second section we
review the debate over whether American workers are putting in more
hours at work. In the third we rely on longitudinal data to show that
individual workers are increasingly having more ups and downs in their
employment history. Finally, in the fourth section we provide a range of
policy implications we believe follow from the evidence we have pre-
sented regarding the historic shift in labor supply regime.
The NAIRU and the Labor Supply Curv e
Until quite recently economists’ pessimism about the potential for simul-
taneous low unemployment and low inflation was based on a particular
model of labor market behavior. Unused capacity in the workforce was
thought to be virtually exhausted at “low” official unemployment rates.
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With fewer workers seeking jobs, employers seeking additional staff have
to raise wages in order to coax workers to leave other firms to join theirs.
And workers, with confidence in their ability to find work elsewhere and
to find more remunerative work, pre s s u re their current employers for
higher pay. When enough workers do this and employers capitulate to
their demands, firms are forced to raise their prices to cover the added
costs—or see their profits erode. Rising prices motivate workers to ask
for additional wages to maintain their purchasing power. In many union
contracts, “cost-of-living adjustments” (COLAs) automatically do this.
Left unchecked, an overheated economy generates sufficient upward
price pressure to undermine profit rates and stock market prices. In turn,
investment begins to shrink and the economy heads into a tailspin. 
In this way, inflation leads ineluctably to its opposite—recession. The
wage-price spiral begins with unemployment below its “natural rate.”
Prices then rise at ever faster rates until stable corporate planning can no
longer be maintained. As firms cut back on production and lay off per-
sonnel, unemployment grows and workers begin to experience job inse-
c u r i t y. Lower production and the growing inability of workers to win
wage increases finally undermine inflationary pre s s u res. The slowdown
ultimately lays the seeds for a recovery, but not without large losses in
output and income.
To forestall a much deeper recession, the Federal Reserve Board is sup-
posed to resort to preemptive action, raising short-term interest rates to
slow the economy and nudge unemployment rates back up into a “safe”
zone. The Fed action, if done right, is seen as something like a vaccina-
tion: a small dose of a pathogen builds up immunity to a virulent 
infection. If it is assumed that low unemployment rates are a good indi-
cator of inflation-generating tight labor markets, then such Fed action
can be justified as a deliberate intervention to moderate the cycle of
inflation and recession. We may not like the idea that a reserve of 7 to 8
million unemployed workers is needed to moderate the business cycle,
but the presumed alternative of re c u rrent bouts of hyperinflation and
double-digit unemployment is viewed as considerably more threatening.
This concept of a “natural rate” of unemployment was first introduced by
Milton Friedman (1968) and almost simultaneously by Edmund Phelps
(1968). Its more formal name, the “nonaccelerating-inflation rate 
of unemployment,” or NAIRU, suggests that below some “natural”
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unemployment rate increases in aggregate demand will result not simply
in price increases, but in accelerating rates of inflation. Early estimates of
the NAIRU, based on experience in the United States from 1960
to1990, placed the natural rate in the neighborhood of 6 percent. Any
attempts to keep unemployment below this level were expected to have
dire consequences.
Ever since the concept of the NAIRU was first propounded, it has been
criticized on both theoretical and statistical grounds. In recent work,
R o b e rt Eisner (1996) demonstrates a significant asymmetry in the
NAIRU. He finds that while unemployment above the NAIRU has his-
torically lowered inflation in the United States as the theory suggests,
rates below the NAIRU have not necessarily led to rising inflation.
Hence, the natural rate hypothesis itself is open to dispute. Others,
including Robert J. Gordon (1997) and Douglas Staiger, James Stock,
and Mark Watson (1997) conclude that a NAIRU exists, but it varies
over time. In analyzing the period 1955 to 1996, Gordon concludes that
the time-varying NAIRU drifted downward from 6.2 percent in the late
1980s to 5.7 percent in the mid 1990s. Staiger, Stock, and Watson also
find a decline in the point estimates of the NAIRU from 6.8 percent in
1984 to 5.9 percent in 1994 as well as a large standard error around the
estimated point estimates. 
The key point, however, is that in all of these cases the variable of note is
the official unemployment rate and inflationary pre s s u res are still thought
to be forthcoming at unemployment rates well in excess of 5 perc e n t .
Members of the Federal Reserve Board have indicated that they consider
many factors in addition to the official unemployment rate in gauging
potential inflationary pre s s u re in the economy, including the extent to
which physical capital is being utilized and the degree to which the stock
market may be overvalued. Still, the official unemployment rate is clearly
the single indicator of unused capacity that receives the most attention.3
Fighting the Last Wa r
What has motivated Fed policy during the past two decades is a steadfast
vigilance against any possible re c u rrence of the violent business cycle
that pummeled American families and businesses during the late 1970s
and early 1980s. The annual rate of increase in the consumer price index
May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 14The Growth in Work Hours
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
rose from 5.8 percent in 1976 to an unprecedented 13.5 percent in 1980
as unemployment fell from 8.5 percent in 1975 to 5.8 percent in 1979.
Back then the Fed, under newly appointed chairman Paul Volcker, raised
interest rates deliberately to crush inflation, slowing the economy to the
point where, in December 1982, the national unemployment rate
reached nearly 11 percent. Since no one wants to live through that terri-
ble experience again, the low unemployment rates over the past two 
and half years are viewed with some real concern. The historical record
seems to provide a signal that we have crossed over into the danger 
zone where a tight labor market will lead to an explosive wage-price
inflationary cycle.
But will it?  If a 4.6 percent jobless rate connotes the same degree of
labor market tightness as it did in the 1970s, then we are almost surely in
for another bout of serious inflation unless the Fed applies the monetary
brakes. On the other hand, if the unemployment rate is no longer a reliable
m e a s u re of the remaining store of unutilized labor, then it may be safe to
ignore the unemployment rate and allow the economy to grow without
attempting to moderate it. The danger may lie in “fighting the last war,”
a re f e rence to how veteran generals have pursued new wars using the
outdated lessons from what went wrong in the last. 
Data on the past three business cycle expansions suggest that a labor
regime shift has occurred. In Figure 1 we have plotted the inflation rate
against the unemployment rate. For each of the three expansions
(1975–1979, 1982–1989, 1992–1996), the data series begins in the year
in which the unemployment rate reached a cyclical peak and is followed
until the jobless rate bottoms out. 
As the figure demonstrates, the trade-off between unemployment and
inflation has improved markedly since the 1970s. Inflation then was run-
ning in excess of 6.0 percent a year even with 7.5 percent of the labor
force unemployed. As the unemployment rate came down, the inflation
rate rose sharply in a clear Phillip’s curve pattern. Tightening labor mar-
kets plus pent-up price pressures from the abolition of Nixon era wage
and price controls plus the second oil shock of the decade drove infla-
tion to record levels as the unemployment rate fell below 6.5 percent. 
The trade-off during the 1980s recovery was much more benign. During
the entire expansionary portion of the cycle, inflation remained below
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1970 rates and the entire unemployment-inflation pattern was generally
flat until unemployment fell below 6.5 percent. In the current recovery,
there is hardly any hint of a trade-off. Even at jobless rates below 6.0 per -
cent, there does not appear to be a Phillip’s curve at all. This is what has
economists stumped. History does not appear to be repeating itself as the
unemployment-inflation relationship seems to be fundamentally shift-
ing. It is time-varying as Gordon suggests, but we are not finding much
price pre s s u re even at unemployment rates well below his estimated
NAIRU of 5.7 percent.
Measuring Labor Market Supply
The problem, we believe, lies less in the theory underlying the NAIRU
and more in the data used to estimate it. Essentially, the Phillip’s
c u rve—the trade-off between unemployment and inflation—has been
shifting downward and flattening out not because the curve has ceased
to exist, but because the official unemployment rate is at best a proxy for
labor supply conditions and increasingly a poor one. A given unemploy-
ment rate in the 1990s does not signal the same degree of “tightness” in
labor supply as the same rate did in the 1970s. The relationship between












5 7 6 8 9 10
N o t e : Unemployment rate in period t plotted against inflation rate based on CPI-U in period
t + 1.
S o u rc e : Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the Pre s i d e n t , F e b ru a ry 1997;
“Economic Indicators,” October 1997.
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unused labor supply and inflation may still hold, but one can no longer
rely on the official unemployment rate as a reliable measure of unused
workforce capacity. Very tight labor markets may still lead to wage-price
pressures, but even a 4.6 percent unemployment rate may no longer be
an indication of such labor market conditions.
In its more technical work, hardly ever reported by the media, the BLS
admits the official unemployment rate is only one of many measures of
labor utilization. Indeed, each month the agency calculates a range of
unemployment rates, each including one or more groups of individuals
who are potentially available for work but are not officially unemployed. 
These underutilized workers include those who are working part - t i m e
involuntarily, who are “discouraged” and have given up looking for a job,
and who were previously looking but gave up because of the press of fam-
ily responsibilities or other reasons. Presumably many of these individu-
als would be ready to go back to work if an appropriate job suddenly
became available. Labor force participation, in this case, is a positive
function of job availability. If somehow there are more jobs, there will be
more labor supply to fill them. The greater the elasticity in labor force
participation, the more inaccurate is the official unemployment rate as
an indicator of remaining unused labor supply. 
But there is an even more fundamental reason why relying on the stan-
d a rd jobless rate can be misleading. Measuring the true supply of labor
involves more than counting the number of people working or pre p a re d
to work, as the official measure does. T h e number of hours i n c u m b e n t
workers put in on the job can be just as important as the number of
employed workers. This is completely overlooked in the official statistics
because the BLS counts anyone working one hour or more for pay as in the
labor force and employed. If incumbent workers increase their hours of
work, it is irrelevant to the unemployment rate—but hardly irrelevant to
the level of labor supply. A 1 percent increase in the number of hours
worked per worker for a fixed supply of labor is mathematically equivalent
in terms of labor supply to a 1 percent increase in the number of workers;
f rom the perspective of workforce capacity the two are equivalent.
M o re o v e r, since incumbent workers normally have higher prod u c t i v i t y
than new workers brought in from the end of the hiring queue, incre a s e d
labor supply from existing employees will boost economic growth more
than an equivalent amount of labor supplied by new labor force entrants. 
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S o u rces of Labor Supply in the New Labor Market
If average work hours remained reasonably fixed over time, the unem-
ployment rate would be a good proxy for overall labor supply. But this
has not been the case, as we shall demonstrate. The nature of working
time is changing. A larger and larger proportion of the workforce devi-
ates from working a “standard workweek ” and “standard workyear.” One
in six workers now report working part-time schedules, with one-quarter
of these doing so involuntarily—a sign of “underemployment.” At the
same time, over one in fifteen now report working at two or more jobs,
and many seek as much overtime as is offered them. 
The growing importance of work hours as a factor in total labor supply is
revealed in Table 1. Here the total number of additional hours supplied
to the labor market during the past three expansionary cycles is decom-
posed into four factors: (1) growth in the civilian population age 16 and
above (2) increase in labor force participation (3) decline in the unem-
ployment rate through the return of unemployed workers to work, and
(4) increase in average hours worked per worker per week.4
According to this analysis, somewhere between two-fifths and one-half
of the additional hours worked during the past three expansionary peri-
ods was supplied as a result of simple population growth. This increase in
supply is, of course, independent of the business cycle. The contributions
Table 1 Sources of Additional Hours of Work (percent)
Source 1975–1979 1982–1989 1992–1995
Growth in civilian 51.0 41.4 46.7
population age 16 and above
Increase in labor force 27.2 19.7 4.7
participation rate
Decline in unemployment 19.7 24.6 32.0
rate
Increase in average hours 2.2 14.2 16.6
worked per week
Total increase in hours workeda 100.0 100.0 100.0
aTotals do not add up to 100.0 because of rounding.
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987; 1997); special tabulations on hours from
Current Population Survey data.
May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 18The Growth in Work Hours
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
of the other three elements, however, vary over the cycle and have var-
ied rather dramatically in their relative importance from one period to
the next. More than one-fourth of the additional hours worked in the
1970s can be attributed to the increase in labor force participation. By
the 1990s this source accounted for less than 5 percent of the total addi-
tional hours. After decades of rising participation rates, particularly as a
result of increased participation by women, the trajectory reached a
plateau in the first years of the current recovery. It began to grow again
at a faster pace only in 1996 and 1997. 
In sharp contrast, the role of declining unemployment and, even more
i m p o rt a n t l y, the role of increasing average weekly hours have gro w n
remarkably over time. In the late 1970s less than one-fifth of additional
work time was due to workers’ being called back to work from unem-
ployment. By the 1990s this factor accounted for nearly a third of the
addition to total work time. The increased contribution from longer
workweeks was even more significant. In the 1970s practically none of
the total increase in work time was due to existing workers’ putting in
more hours. By the 1990s fully one-sixth of the additional labor supply
came from incumbent workers. 
Together, the combined contribution of unemployed workers returning
to work and incumbent workers putting in longer workweeks now
accounts for nearly half of the increased labor supply that is sustaining
noninflationary economic growth in the early 1990s. Back in the 1970s
these two factors accounted for only about one-fifth of the total—the rest
coming from new labor force participants. This is the essence of the
labor supply regime shift. We are now obtaining additions to labor sup-
ply more from experienced workers than from new labor force recruits
and a good share of this added supply is forthcoming when the official
unemployment rate signals little slack in the economy.
The “Backward Bending” Supply Curv e
It is reasonable to ask why we are now seeing so much more labor 
e ff o rt forthcoming from incumbent workers. A combination of stan-
d a rd labor supply theory and the current environment of stagnating 
wage rates and heightened job insecurity explains a large part of 
this behavior.
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ing, as we do the supply curves for goods and services. But the labor sup-
ply curve is, in fact, fundamentally diff e rent and can actually bend
b a c k w a rd. The offer of higher wages can, under realistic conditions,
reduce the supply of labor and lower wages can increase it. This is well
known among labor economists and is due to the fact that supply is
influenced by both income and substitution effects. 
Increases in income per se (that is, increases in income but not necessar-
ily in wage rate) induce a worker to consume more leisure, there b y
reducing the willingness to work. This is the income effect.5 Where an
increase in income comes as a result of an increase in pay rate, there is
both an income effect, because the higher wage rate provides a higher
income at the same hours of work, and a substitution effect, because an
hour of leisure is now more expensive. An additional hour of leisure can
be purchased only at the higher price of the forgone income from the
new higher wage rate. The income effect leads the worker to work less,
while the substitution effect leads the worker to want to work more .
Depending on the relative strength of the two effects, an increase in the
wage rate can increase labor supply, reduce it, or leave it unchanged. 
Normally, we think of the substitution effect as dominating the income
effect. This is what gives us the usual upward-sloping labor supply curve
and the expectation that higher wages are needed to coax out more labor
from “leisure” time activities. There are at least two cases, however, in
which it is possible to obtain increased labor supply without a concomi-
tant increase in wage rates. The first involves “target income” or “target
consumption” behavior; when individuals work in order to meet a fixed
income or consumption level, labor supply will be inversely related to the
wage rate. Offered a higher wage, a worker will cut back his or her hours,
taking the gain in the form of leisure. In this case, there is a pure income
effect. Similarly, if the wage rate falls, the worker will have to work more
hours to compensate for the lower pay rate. Hence, stagnating or falling
wages in the face of fixed mortgage payments, car payments, and out-
standing credit card balances will force workers to put in more hours at
work, not less.
The second case involves job insecurity, or at least the expectation of job
instability. Assuming that individuals have some long-run income objec-
tive, they will attempt to set aside a cushion against future loss. Hence, if
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workers fear a future layoff or involuntary part-time hours, they might
attempt to increase their current work hours to compensate. Overt i m e
work and “moonlighting” are a form of income insurance for workers fac-
ing potentially unstable work futures. They may be willing to work all
the hours they are offered at their current wage rate or may take on sec-
ond jobs at current or even lower wage rates in order to accumulate
income reserves. When jobs are plentiful, such individuals will be there
to supply the additional hours, even at existing pay rates.
It is precisely this type of labor force behavior that can help explain the
change in labor supply regime we have identified. The preconditions for a
backward-bending labor supply curve have been developing for the past quarter
c e n t u ry. Real hourly wages of production and nonsuperv i s o ry workers
peaked in 1973. Since then, they have declined from $8.55 (in 1982 dol-
lars) to $7.43 in 1996 (Council of Economic Advisers 1997). Even with
the recent re c o v e ry, wages have continued to stagnate. Between 1991
and early 1997 the real average wage rose a total of just 2¢ per hour. In
such a long-term wage climate, target income behavior is likely.
Similarly, there is evidence that job insecurity is on the rise. Greenspan
cites, for example, a time-series survey of workers carried out at 444 large
companies by the International Survey Research Company (reported in
The New York Times, February 27, 1997, B6). In 1986 only 20 percent of
respondents were “frequently concerned about being laid off.” Less than
24 percent of those working for these companies were frequently worried
about job loss even during the deep recessions of the 1980s. Ten years
later the comparable figure was 46 percent. It is not unlikely that work-
ers who feel such insecurity will feel pressure to take on added work when
it is available and will be willing to do so even at their current wage rate.
Again, we have Say’s law in reverse and the conditions for non-
inflationary growth at low recorded unemployment rates. 
But how much have the hours of work of incumbent workers actually
increased and who is supplying them? Is the change in supply sufficient
to permit us to declare a shift in labor supply regime? Do we have any
evidence that changing work time is related to trends in wages and earn-
ings? What do we know about trends in job instability and possible
working time responses to them? To answer these questions, we review
recent studies of working time and develop a new analysis based on lon-
gitudinal and cross-sectional data. The results provide direct proof of a
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c i rcumstantial evidence ties the increase to stagnating wages and
increasing job insecurity.
Is Average Working Time Rising or Falling in the 
United States?
In an earlier paper, we put forth the claim that Americans are both
“ o v e rworked” and “underemployed” (Bluestone and Rose 1997). Our
re s e a rch was initially motivated by the debate set off by Juliet Schor’s
book The Overworked American, in which she estimated that Americans
worked an average of 163 more hours a year in 1990 than they had in
1970—the equivalent of nearly an extra month of full-time work 
(Schor 1991). Men were working an average of two and a half more
weeks per year and women an average of seven and half more weeks.
This increase reversed over a century of declining working time.
American workers were now working more per year than workers in any
other advanced country.6
Many researchers criticized Schor’s view, citing other labor market indi-
cators that seemed to signal that working time was really decreasing. For
example, employer surveys—the very ones the Bureau of Labor Statistics
uses to measure working time when it re p o rts the monthly unemploy-
ment rate each month—show weekly hours in manufacturing and
weekly hours in the rest of the economy going in opposite directions. It
is true that the use of overtime is becoming the norm in much of manu-
facturing, but manufacturing seems to be the odd man out. For all indus-
tries taken together, the number of weekly hours on the typical job has
been shrinking steadily since World War II. 
Much of this shrinking is due to the growth in employment in non-
s t a n d a rd work arrangements. In such sectors as retail trade part-time hours
a re common, and one of the fastest growing employment sectors over the
last 15 years has been temporary help. Part-time jobs, the increased use 
of “contract employees,” and other forms of “contingent” work are 
l a rgely responsible for the re p o rted shortening of the workweek (Belous
1989; Tilly 1996).7 The growth in nonstandard work might seem to
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a re declining, but just the opposite might be true. Average hours per
worker could be rising because incumbent workers are taking on part -
time, contingent, and temp work in addition to their current employment. 
New Estimates of Working Time 
The foregoing suggests that because some Americans are putting in very
long hours and others are facing underemployment as a result of part -
time and contingent employment, the trend in average work time could
go in either direction. There is a lively statistical debate over what is
actually happening to working time in America. 
Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Larry Mishel
and Jared Bernstein (1994) have re-estimated annual work hours for var-
ious years. Their re s e a rch confirms Schor’s finding of increased annual
work hours, but for a comparable period (1973 to 1992) their estimate is
only three-fifths as large as her 163 hours. They calculate that in 1973
the average workweek (for employed and self-employed workers in pub-
lic and private sectors) was 38.4 hours. The average workyear was 43.2
weeks, yielding an estimate of 1,659 hours of work per year. By 1992 the
average workweek had climbed by 0.6 hours and the average workyear by
2.0 weeks. Hence, average annual hours had risen to 1,759, an increase
of 100 hours, or 6 percent.  Three-quarters of the increase, they estimate,
can be attributed to more weeks worked per year, one-quarter to
increased hours per week.
While Mishel and Bernstein’s estimates are more modest than Schor’s,
they clearly support the “overworked American” thesis. But critics argue
that the survey data used by Schor and by Mishel and Bernstein are
unreliable. Their estimates of hours worked are based on the March CPS
for each year. Among several dozen questions about labor market activ-
ity, respondents are asked to report “hours worked last week” and “usual
weekly hours of work last year,” and they have only a short time to
answer all the questions. Critics believe that in making what may be a
wild guess, particularly for those whose hours vary substantially fro m
week to week, respondents guess high. And the more they say they work,
the higher they guess. 
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that ask respondents to keep a 24-hour diary of everything they do over
a one- to two-week period (Robinson and Bostrom 1994). Such time
diary surveys were first carried out by the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center in 1965 and 1975 and then again by the University of
Maryland in 1985.8 Diary entries are considered more reliable than CPS
surveys because respondents are required to account for every minute of
the time segment they are asked to audit, formal work time is not singled
out for special attention, and the recall period is at most one or two days. 
John Robinson, of the University of Maryland, and Ann Bostrom, of
G e o rgia Tech University, found that the gap between hours re p o rt e d
using CPS-type questions and the hours reported in diaries increases as
the number of re p o rted hours of work rises. Among those re p o rt i n g
between 20 and 44 weekly hours, the estimates were only slightly higher
than the diary entries. Among workers claiming to “usually” work more
than 55 hours per week, the gap was 10 hours or more per week. Values
of the CPS-diary diff e rence were generally higher among women than
men. Robinson and Bostrom conclude that “the diary data suggest that
only rare individuals put in more than a 55-60 hour workweek, with
those estimating 60 or more hours on the job averaging closer to 53-hour
weeks.” These results imply that Americans are not as overworked as
CPS estimates suggest.
How can we reconcile the Schor and the Mishel and Bernstein findings
with the Robinson and Bostrom findings? A large part of the answer lies
in the fact that Schor and Mishel and Bernstein are looking at annual
hours of work and most of the increase in hours is due to increases in
weeks worked, not hours worked per week—the focus of Robinson and
B o s t ro m ’s diary studies. As we re p o rted above, Mishel and Bern s t e i n
found that about three-fourths of the increase in annual hours of work 
is accounted for by increased weeks of work—a factor ignored in the
diary studies.
But even accounting for this, the issue of working time remained unre-
solved. To subject the “overworked American” hypothesis to another
attempt at empirical verification, we decided to investigate the issue
with still a third set of data—the longitudinal Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID).
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Income Dynamics (PSID)
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is an annual survey col-
lected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center since
1968. Instead of a snapshot that is supposed to reflect the overall popu-
lation in different years, the PSID has been surveying the same families
year after year. Part of its standard labor market section is a series of
questions used to ascertain annual hours of work. The survey asks each
respondent to recall how many days he or she was on vacation, sick
leave, strike, or leave due to other family members’ illness. It asks ques-
tions about regular hours of work per week and weeks worked on the
re s p o n d e n t ’s main job and on up to three other jobs held during the
year. All of this information is combined to yield an estimate of annual
work hours. Although the PSID survey suffers from recall problems as
does the CPS survey, the greater detail on each job and annual working
time presumably permits better estimates than can be obtained from the
CPS survey.
These data can be used in two fashions. First, we can compute estimates
of yearly working hours. Second, the longitudinal aspect of the PSID
allows us to trace year-to-year variations for individual workers over a
10-year period. Further, because the PSID started in 1968, we can com-
pare the history of working time during two 10-year periods—the 1970s
(1969–1979) and the 1980s (1979–1989), each encompassing two com-
plete business cycles. Demographic information is available so that we
can track trends in annual work hours for families and individuals, for
men and women, for whites and blacks, and for segments of the popula-
tion with differing amounts of schooling. 
Using the PSID first as a series of cross sections, we computed the aver-
age hours of work in each year from 1967 through 1989 for prime-age
workers (age 25 to 54). In this case, the sample individuals in each year
vary as younger individuals enter the prime-age group and aging workers
leave it. We limited our sample in each year to those who reported hours
of work, eliminating from consideration those who were out of the labor
force in a given year. Separate estimates were run by gender, race, and
education. Figure 2, showing the trend in annual hours for all prime-age
workers, gives clear evidence of variation related to the business cycle.
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the steep 1981–1982 recession. But overwhelming the business cycle is a
distinct U-shaped long-run trend in hours of work. When we compare
1979 and 1989 directly, the last two business cycle peaks, we find aver-
age annual hours increased by 79 over the decade.9 Over a longer period,
this increase marked not so much a startling increase as a return to levels
that prevailed in the late 1960s.
To obtain a more accurate estimate of the trend in hours (one that con-
trols for the business cycle), we ran regressions where a time trend and
the unemployment rate were regressed on annual hours of work for the
entire 1967 to 1989 period. The results of the regression for all workers
and for various subgroups are found in Table A1 in the appendix.10 After
c o n t rolling for the business cycle, there is a small, statistically signifi-
cant, overall upward trend in annual hours for prime-age workers as a
group. The trend amounts to only 3.3 hours per year. Hence, over a 20-
year period, we found a 66-hour increase in annual work—the equiva-
lent of 1.5 FTE (full-time equivalent, based on a 40-hour week) weeks
per year. This is well below Schor’s estimate of 163 hours and a third
below Mishel and Bernstein’s estimate of 100. Nonetheless, the trend is
decidedly upward in contrast to the essentially flat line Robinson and
Bostrom find for the 1965 to 1985 period using the diary method. 
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Figure 2 Average Annual Hours Worked, All Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
87 88 89
Source: Authors’ analysis of PSID data.
Year
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and women. Among men, the trend was found to be slightly negative
after controlling for the business cycle. Over a 20-year period, the regres-
sion model projected a 53-hour decline in cycle-adjusted annual hours—
just a bit steeper than the Robinson-Bostrom diary estimate of 36 hours
(but clearly in the opposite direction from Schor’s positive trend esti-
mate.)11 For women, the trend is strongly positive. Indeed, our estimate
of 18.8 additional hours per year translated into a 20-year total some-
what greater than even Schor’s estimate—9.4 FTE weeks vs. 7.5 FTE
weeks.  It should also be noted that working women’s hours were increas-
ing at the same time that a higher proportion of the total paid workforce
was made up of women.
We also found significant diff e rences in the hours trajectories by race.
Reflecting trends well-documented elsewhere, our point estimate of a
decline of 7.7 hours per year for black men translated into an average
workyear in the late 1980s more than 150 hours shorter than in the late
1960s. For 1989, we estimated that black men averaged only 1,950 hours
per year compared with just under 2,300 hours for white men. Higher
unemployment rates were responsible for part of this difference. Shorter
workweeks explain the remainder.12
The racial gap in hours worked among women revealed an intriguing
time pattern. On an annual basis, there appeared to have been virtually
no gap in work hours in 1967. The gap then widened significantly so
that by the mid 1970s black women were working almost 200 hours
more per year than white women. White women caught up again so that
by 1989 white and black women were working virtually the same
amount. To close the gap, white women’s cycle-adjusted hours had to
rise substantially faster than that of black women. This is precisely what
happened, as the entries in Table A1 demonstrate. Over 20 years, white
w o m e n ’s annual hours increased by the equivalent of 10.3 FTE weeks,
nearly double the 5.4 FTE weeks for black women.
Our original work, therefore, confirmed an increase in hours worked by
individual workers—not quite as large as either Schor’s or Mishel and
Bernstein’s estimates, but large enough to constitute a sharp reversal of
the previous long-term trend toward declining working time. This is the
first evidence of a new labor supply regime.
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Our investigation of working time did not end with looking at individual
workers. We also investigated family work time and family earnings. We
began by estimating the combined hours of work for “prime-age” families
in which both husband and wife were working.13 The long-term trend is
shown in Figure 3. There was, as expected, a clear and nearly unbroken
trend toward much greater work effort, interrupted only modestly by the
recessions of 1971, 1974–1975, and 1980–1982. By 1988 prime-age
working couples were putting in an average of 3,450 hours per year in
combined employment, up from 2,850 two decades before.14
These estimates were also subjected to re g ression analysis to eliminate
business cycle effects. The results are found in Table A2 in the appendix.
According to the regression, for all husband-wife working couples, family
work effort increased by more than 32 hours per year each year during
the 1970s and 1980s—the equivalent of adding nearly another month of
full-time work effort every five years (160 hours). Hence, in the span of
just two decades, working husband-wife couples increased their a n n u a l
market work input by a cycle-adjusted 684 hours or four months of full-
time work. Put still another way, the typical dual-earner couple at 
the end of the 1980s was spending an additional day and half on the 
job every week. 
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Figure 3 Average Annual Hours Worked, Prime-Age Families 
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Note: Limited to intact husband-wife families in which husband is prime age (25–54).
Source: Authors’ analysis of PSID data.
Year
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and by education. The increase in working hours among white working
couples was 60 percent larger than the increase for black couples—a
reflection of both the sharp decline in black men’s hours and the 
l a rge increase in white female work eff o rt. More-educated working 
couples also increased their work eff o rt more than those with less 
schooling. Those in which the husband had at least a four-year 
college degree increased their combined work effort by nearly 730 hours
c o m p a red to an increase of only 490 hours for couples headed by a 
high school dropout. 
How much did this enormous increase in work eff o rt pay off in terms 
of increased family earnings? Are families working longer hours to
i m p rove their standard of living or simply to maintain it? The results 
for this inquiry are found in Table 2 in which growth in combined 
real earnings is compared to changes in combined work hours for the
period 1973 to 1988.15
For prime-age working couples as a group, combined real earnings rose
by 18.5 percent between 1973 and 1988 (an increase from $43,851 to
$51,955 in 1991 dollars). These families there f o re saw their material
standard of living increase by just a little bit better than 1 percent per
y e a r. Most of this modest increase, however, did not come fro m
improved wages, but from increased work effort. The 18.5 percent increase
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Table 2 Percentage Growth in Annual Hours Worked vs. Percentage
Change in Real Annual Earnings, Prime-Age Working Husband-Wife
Couples, 1973–1988
Combined Combined “Family” Hourly
Hours Real Earnings Wage
All 16.3 18.5 1.8
White 17.1 19.8 2.2
Black 11.8 15.8 3.6
High school dropout 11.6 –8.2 –17.7
High school graduate 16.1 3.7 –10.7
Some college 17.4 3.8 –11.5
College graduate 16.6 32.5 13.6
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PSID data.
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Over the entire 16-year period, the combined average husband-wife
hourly wage i n c reased by only 1.8 percent—the equivalent of a re a l
hourly wage increase of less than 2 cents each year! The average working
family with two earners appears to have been able to increase its con-
sumption over time, but only by working much longer to enjoy what is
basically a modest improvement in the amount of goods and services it
can buy. The story is much the same for both white and black families;
real earnings rise, but chiefly because of increased work effort. 
However, when the data are disaggregated by education group, we find
an even more telling story than that of workers sacrificing family time in
o rder to indulge in a cornucopia of consumption. With the notable
exception of families headed by a worker with at least a college degree,
the enormous increase in work effort over the past 20 years has done no
more than permit families on average to maintain their old standard of
living. For families headed by a high school dropout, the situation has
been especially tough. Between 1973 and 1988 these families increased
their annual work effort by nearly 12 percent, yet they ended up with 8
percent less annual income. For families headed by a high school gradu-
ate or a worker with some college, work eff o rt was up by 16.0 to 17.4
p e rcent, but all these added hours left them with an increase in total
earnings of less than 4 percent. These families are trapped in an Alice in
Wonderland world, running faster and faster just to stay in the same
place. For families of all levels of education except college graduates the 
“family” hourly wage has fallen precipitously, by as much as over 17 per-
cent in the case of the high school dropout.
The one great exception to the Alice in Wonderland world is found in
families headed by a college graduate. These families increased their
work effort by about the same percentage as families headed by a high
school graduate or a worker with some college, but their added work
e ff o rt paid off, permitting their combined real earnings to increase by
nearly a third between 1973 and 1988. In this one case, hard work
a p p a rently had its re w a rd. Unfort u n a t e l y, such well-educated families
constitute less than a third of all families. For most other families,
i n c reasing their work time can be understood as a response to falling
wage rates—evidence of behavior consistent with being on the 
backward-bending portion of the labor supply curve.
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Our earlier work relied on PSID data that went only through 1989. To
investigate the trend in hours worked since 1989, we turn to the Current
Population Survey.16 The first task is to compare annual hours estimates
from the two data sources we have been using. Although the CPS and
the PSID ask different questions to ascertain work hours, we found such
a close correspondence between the two data series that in this new
work we feel confident in using the CPS, as well as the PSID, as the
basis for estimating working time (see Figure 4).17 The correspondence is
close enough that, in some cases, we have concatenated the two files in
order to produce a full 1967 to 1995 data series.18
We focus our initial analysis on the prime-age workforce. Figure 5 repro-
duces Figure 2, adding the data from 1989 to 1995. It shows, as before,
the tre n d — o r, more accurately, the two trends—in annual work hours
since the late 1960s. While there is a clear cyclical component in the
data, the sharp decline in annual hours from 1967 through 1982 and the
even sharper monotonic increase through the business cycle peak in
1989 are readily apparent (indicated by the superimposed slopes). What
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Figure 4 Average Annual Hours Worked, All Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
87 88 89





May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 31we see on Figure 5 is that following a brief dip during the 1990–1991
recession, the growth in hours began to climb again. In 1995 average
annual hours reached a new peak (1,979), surpassing its 1967 level. Since
the last business cycle peak in 1989, annual hours have increased by another
32 hours—a 1.6 percent increase in labor supply from incumbent workers.
The upward trend in working time shows no sign of easing.
F i g u res 6 and 7 depict the same data by gender. Considered together, the
two figures indicate that from 1967 through 1982 the overall decline in
annual hours was due to a collapse in men’s hours that could not be fully
o ffset by increases in women’s hours. After 1982, however, even men’s
hours began to increase, and they continued to do so right through the
1989 to 1995 period. Since 1989 the average workyear for men has
i n c reased by 18 hours (nearly half an FTE workweek), or 0.8 perc e n t .
Over the same period the average workyear for women has increased by 57
hours, or 3.3 percent. Note also the sharp cyclical re c o v e ry in men’s hours
since the recession of 1991–1992. 
Changes in annual hours can be broken down into two components:
changes in annual weeks worked and changes in average weekly hours
worked. The former includes the effect of changes in the official 
unemployment rate, while the latter does not. As we have measured them
h e re, weekly hours are estimated only for those who are already counted as
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Figure 5 Average Annual Hours Worked, All Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
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Figure 6 Average Annual Hours Worked, Male Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
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Figure 7 Average Annual Hours Worked, Female Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
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employed. Figure 8 shows the increase in average weeks worked. Note that
in 1979, when the unemployment rate was 5.8 percent, prime-age workers
averaged 46.0 weeks of work per year. In 1987, when the jobless rate was
6.2 percent, the average workyear was longer—about 46.8 weeks. Thus, by
1987 a portion of the overall labor supply “lost” to unemployment was
being made up for by the increased time those who were working were
contributing to the labor market.
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low inflation is what we have found re g a rding average weekly hours.
Figure 9 shows the trend for prime-age workers since 1975. Of particular
note are the remarkably diff e rent patterns following the recessions of
1975, 1981–1982, and 1991 (indicated by the superimposed slopes).
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Figure 9 Average Weekly Hours Worked, All Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
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Figure 8 Average Annual Weeks Worked, All Prime-Age Workers 
(Age 25–54)
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1975 level by 1979. Essentially, there was no added labor supply coming
f rom incumbent prime-age workers during this strong economic re c o v-
e ry. In the last two recoveries, however, average weekly hours climbed
d r a m a t i c a l l y. This is the clearest sign yet of a change in labor supply
regime and, as we have suggested, helps to explain the Phillip’s curves for
the 1980s and 1990s that are flatter than the traditional curve for the
recovery following the 1975 recession.
I n c reased Work Eff o rt in the Total Wo r k f o rc e
To this point, we have focused on the prime-age workforce in order to
compare recent trends with earlier ones. We used this age group to assure
that estimates of changes in working time were independent of changes
in the age composition of the workforc e .1 9 For present purposes, how-
ever, we should measure work time trends among all workers, for this is
the relevant variable for studies of the macro economy. 
The results of our all-worker CPS analysis are found in Figures 10
through 14. Despite the fact that we are no longer holding the age pro-
file constant, trends shown in these figures closely resemble the trends
we found for prime-age workers. Figure 10 provides the 1975 to 1995
t rend in weekly hours for all workers age 16 and older. Weekly hours
expanded from a low of 37.6 in 1982 to a level in 1995 of close to 39.0.
F rom a labor supply perspective, this is equivalent to increasing the
number of workers in the economy by 3.7 percent. Given that the work-
force was about 100 million strong in 1982, this increase in weekly hours
is approximately equivalent to the addition of 3.7 million new workers
to the total workforce or a reduction of the official unemployment rate
by 3.7 percentage points. Between 1982 and 1995 the workforce as con-
ventionally measured increased by 25.4 million. Hence, the increase in
weekly hours among incumbent workers was equivalent to about 15 
percent of the hours available from new workers. This is hardly a trivial
amount, yet it is overlooked in measures of labor supply based on official
unemployment rates.
The weekly hours trends for the past three recoveries can be seen in
Figure 10. Note that in the 1975–1979 recovery, weekly hours increased
by only 0.05 hours each year—the equivalent of just one-tenth of an
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increased to 0.13 hours per year—the equivalent of a full hour per week
of additional work. Finally, in the 1992–1995 recovery weekly work time
rose by 0.16 hours per year. Again, the evidence is consistent with 
a labor supply regime change beginning in the 1980s and continuing 
to the present.
F i g u res 11 and 12 depict the weekly hours trends for men and women sep-
a r a t e l y. The hours re c o v e ry for men since 1982 is particularly notewort h y.
By 1995 the average workweek was back up to the peak level reached in
1979, 41.7 hours. More o v e r, the rate of increase grew over the last thre e
recoveries; in the 1992–1995 re c o v e ry, weekly hours increased by 0.20
hour per year, about four times the rate of the 1970s expansion.
For women, there has been a nearly continuous increase in weekly hours.
Despite reports that women have reached a plateau in labor force partic-
ipation and workforce attachment, the shift to longer working time
seems to be as strong as ever. In 1975 women averaged 33.9 hours per
week. During the 1975–1979 economic re c o v e ry they increased their
weekly hours at a rate of 0.076 hours per year. At that pace by 1995 they
would have been working 35.4 hours per week. In actuality, they were
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Figure 10 Average Weekly Hours Worked, All Workers (Age 16+)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS data.
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Figure 11 Average Weekly Hours, Men (Age 16+)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS data.
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Figure 12 Average Weekly Hours, Women (Age 16+)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS data.
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working even more—35.8 hours—indicating a slight accelerating shift
from part-time to full-time work.
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well. As Figure 13 demonstrates, whites, blacks, and Hispanics have all
seen increases in the length of their workweeks, but at diff e rent rates.
Whites still work the longest workweek, but the gap between whites and
blacks is closing—in contrast to the annual hours patterns for prime-age
workers. In 1975 whites worked 1.6 hours more per week than blacks; by
1995 the gap had closed by nearly half to 0.86 hours. Hispanics had the
slowest increase in weekly hours, having started out at the white level.
They kept pace with whites throughout most of the period, but began to
fall behind after 1989. This may reflect recent immigration patterns and,
as we shall presently demonstrate, the role of education. 
F i g u re 14 shows the trend in weekly hours by years of schooling. In 
general, the most educated workers, had the longest workweek. 
College-educated workers averaged 41.6 hours per week in 1995 com-
pared to only 35.2 hours for high school dropouts. High school graduates
and workers with one to three years of college fell near the middle of
these two extremes. These results help explain the overall upward trend
in weekly hours. As the labor force has become better educated, a larger
proportion of the workforce falls into schooling categories that normally
work longer hours. By 1995, 25 percent of the workforce had a college
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Figure 13 Average Weekly Hours Worked, All Workers (Age 16+) by
Race and Ethnicity
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS data.
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the level of education had not increased over these 20 years, average
work time would have increased by only about 9 minutes (from 38.16 to
38.31 hours) between 1975 and 1995.2 0 The actual increase in work
time was 48 minutes. Hence, more than 80 percent of the long-ru n
increase in average weekly hours over the past 20 years can be associated
with the increased education level of the workforce. Schooling con-
tributes to faster economic growth not only by improving labor produc-
t i v i t y, but also by adding to the overall level of labor supply, a factor
overlooked in the NAIRU debate but partly responsible for the fact that
NAIRU is now seen as time-varying and falling.
The contribution of increased education to increased weekly hours
varies substantially across the last three business cycles. During the
1975–1979 re c o v e ry nearly 90 percent of the small total (7 minute)
increase in the average workweek is associated with rising schooling lev-
els. This leaves little of the increase to be explained by other factors,
such as worker response to changing wage rates and worker expectations
about job insecurity. In the two most recent recoveries, however, these
other factors clearly dominate. Only 17.3 percent of the 65-minute total
i n c rease in weekly hours between 1982 and 1989 can be attributed to
The Growth in Work Hours
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Figure 14 Average Weekly Hours Worked, All Workers (Age 16+) by
Education
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Source: Authors’ analysis of CPS data.
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the total 25-minute increase is associated with schooling. Thus, while
over the long run, education plays a critical role in explaining increased
labor supply, in the short run other factors are more import a n t .
Stagnating wages and increased job security are natural candidates. 
Variation in Working Time and Job Insecurity
We have already seen how increased family hours were needed to keep
annual earnings from falling. What do we know about the trend in job
insecurity? If job instability is on the rise, it, too, could help explain the
shift in labor supply permitting wage and price stability to be compatible
with low unemployment rates. If workers are feeling more insecure, they
may voluntarily work as much overtime as is offered by employers when
work is available in order to cushion the blow of depressed income when
joblessness strikes. 
To examine job instability, we turn to the full longitudinal capacity of
the PSID. We separate the PSID into two 10-year time frames, corre-
sponding to the 1970s (1969–1979) and the 1980s (1979–1989). Both of
these 10-year periods had similar growth rates in real output per person
and in job creation and each encompasses two complete business cycles.
This helps make for an appropriate comparison. We restrict our analysis
to prime-age workers in order to exclude those who are likely to be mov-
ing from part-time to full-time work as they leave school and those who
might be moving from full-time to part-time work as they appro a c h
retirement. The longitudinal nature of the data means that our analysis
of each decade covers individuals who were 24 to 48 at the beginning of
a 10-year time frame and were 34 to 58 at the end.
Employment Continuity 
Our first task is to investigate continuity of employment—the ability to
hold a full-time, full-year job consistently over 10 years. We define
“ s t rong” employment continuity as working at least 1,750 hours (50
weeks at 35 hours per week) in 8 out of 10 years and never working less
than 1,000 hours in any single year. Using this definition, the results are
c l e a r. Job stability is declining. In the 1970s, 79 percent of prime-age
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Table A3 in the appendix).
Individual demographic groups had varying degrees of employment conti-
n u i t y, but for every group except college graduates continuity declined
between the 1970s and the 1980s. The decline for black prime-age men
was the most precipitous, from 73 percent to 51 percent, indicating that
nearly half of these men either had a year in which they worked less than
half-time (less than 1,000 hours) or had at least 3 years out of 10 in
which they worked the equivalent of part-time hours (less than 35 hours
per week on average if they worked 50 weeks during the year).  Persistent
low earners (those with 10-year earnings histories that put them in the
lowest earnings quintile) went from over one in two (52 percent) having
s t rong continuity to under one in three (30 percent). Finally, the share of
high school dropouts with strong continuity declined from 68 to 51 per-
cent. These declines show the added difficulty faced by men at the lower
end of the labor force distribution, a finding fully consistent with other
studies showing a sharp deterioration in the labor market fortunes of less-
educated men in general (Mishel and Bernstein 1994; Bluestone 1990a;
Bluestone 1990b; Levy and Murnane 1992).
For women, the 10-year analytic approach accentuates their diff e re n c e
from men in terms of their labor force continuity. In the 1970s prime-age
women averaged only 870 hours of paid labor per year. This level
increased to 1,243 hours per year in the 1980s but still lagged consider-
ably behind the male average of over 2,100 hours. In the 1970s only one
in nine prime-age women (11 percent) met the criteria of strong labor
market continuity (see Table A4 in the appendix). By the 1980s this
ratio had risen to one in five (20 percent). 
Another way of measuring the degree of labor force participation of
prime-age workers is to define “weak” employment continuity as working
full-time, full-year in three or fewer years and working less than 1,000
hours in each of five or more years during a decade. Only 2 percent of
prime-age men in the 1970s had such little labor force activity and only
4 percent in the 1980s. For prime-age women, by contrast, nearly three
out of five had this low level of labor market participation in the 1970s.
In other words, by the definition we have adopted here, 59 percent of
women would be considered part-time or part-year in the 1970s (Table
A4). Only a decade later, this proportion had plummeted to 38 percent.
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United States has increased sharply not only because the labor force 
p a rticipation rates of women are rising, but because many more of 
the women participating in the workforce are now working full-time.
This critical shift in labor supply regime is missed in the standard 
measures of unemployment.21
Employment Connection
How secure individuals feel about their employment is largely tied to
how likely they think it is that they will be laid off in the near future. To
estimate the probability of maintaining employment with the same
e m p l o y e r, we turn again to the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to
determine what proportion of prime-age workers had a “strong” connec-
tion to their employers in the 1970s and 1980s. We confine this analysis
to men. Defining “strong” connection as changing employers in no more
than 1 year out of 10, 67 percent of men in the 1970s met this criterion.
In the 1980s the percentage fell to only 52 percent (see Table A5 in the
appendix). As for “weak” connection to employers—defined as having 4
or more years out of 10 in which a worker changed employers—we find a
doubling of such weak connection from 12 percent in the 1970s to 24
p e rcent in the 1980s. Clearly, job stability, as indicated by these 
measures, has declined precipitously for men.
It is possible that this large increase in instability is the result of workers’
quitting voluntarily to pursue better job prospects. Unfort u n a t e l y, the
g o v e rnment stopped compiling “quit” versus “layoff” statistics in the
1980s. Thus, we cannot say definitively that the decrease in strong con-
nection or the increase in weak connection signifies increasing job inse -
c u r i t y. However, the widely re p o rted re s t ructuring of business in the
1980s suggests that a good deal of the instability is involuntary and
therefore likely to lead to the feeling of insecurity.
I n t e ryear Variance in Work Hours
If job instability affects working time, increased job insecurity could
explain a number of labor market phenomena: increased voluntary 
o v e rtime, increased moonlighting, and, iro n i c a l l y, higher rates of
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nomenon in working time with the same Americans both overw o r k e d
and underemployed? We explore this question by comparing the varia-
tion from year to year in hours worked in the 1980s with the variation 
in the 1970s. 
Two methods of analysis are used to estimate the proportion of workers
who experience a large variance in annual hours worked:
1.   A HiLo analysis measures the pro p o rtion of individuals in a demo-
graphic group who during a decade experience a “HiLo” variation in
annual hours worked. Workers have a HiLo experience if during the
course of a decade they have at least one year in which they work
m o re than 2,400 hours and at least one year in which they work
1,750 hours or less. The “Hi” value is equivalent to an average work-
week of approximately 46 hours or more; the “Lo” value is equivalent
to an average workweek of less than 35 hours. These cutoffs are arbi-
t r a ry, but correspond to reasonable definitions of “ o v e rtime” and
“part-time” work.
2.   A CVi analysis measures the coefficient of variation (a/x –) of annual
hours worked for individuals in a demographic group during each
decade.
An increase in these measures is evidence of the changing nature of
labor supply. To the degree that these measures increase over time, we
have added indication that insecurity is driving increased work time. 
The results for the HiLo analysis for men are found in Table A6 in the
appendix. Among all prime-age males, more than 28 percent experi-
enced year-to-year variation in hours worked during the 1980s that
meets the HiLo criteria of one year of substantial “overtime” (more than
46 hours per week) and at least one year of significant “under
employment” (less than 35 hours per week). Compared to the 1970s, 
the pro p o rtion of individuals experiencing HiLo variance was up by
nearly 5 percent.
For black men HiLo variance is substantially higher than for white men,
with well more than a third of all black men experiencing this “feast and 
famine” type of working hours. While white men experienced less
i n t e ryear variation in hours worked, over the two decades they moved
closer to the black average. In the 1980s high school dro p o u t s
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strongest correlates with the “feast and famine” work pattern are earn-
ings levels and, not unexpectedly, number of job changes. Among those
with average earnings in the lowest quintile, 4 out of 10 experienced
HiLo hours variation in both decades; this correlation is a strong indica-
tion that this working pattern is not voluntary. Similarly, those who
change employers often face the highest rates of HiLo activity. More
than half of prime-age men who change employers at least four times in
a decade end up with years of overtime and years of underemployment—
a further indication of the involuntary nature of job instability.
Which groups showed substantial increase in hours variation between
the two decades? According to Table A6, high school dropouts, college
graduates, and those with earnings in the top and middle quintiles had
the greatest rises in HiLo activity. From this, one might conjecture that
those with the fewest skills and those in the ranks of middle 
management have been particular victims of downsizing, but future
re s e a rch with the PSID is needed to provide more evidence to test 
this hypothesis.
A HiLo analysis for women is driven by diff e rent factors. As we noted
above, relatively few prime-age women work full-time, full-year consistently
over 10 years. Even in the 1980s only 33 percent of prime-age women (ver-
sus 86 percent of men) averaged over 1,750 hours working per year.
T h e re f o re, few women are likely to meet the criterion of long hours in one
y e a r, although most are likely to have at least one year with under 1,750
hours worked. This is borne out in the HiLo data: 12 percent of women met
the HiLo criteria in the 1970s and 21 percent in the 1980s. The diff e re n c e s
among women by race and education were not large, but since women with
higher 10-year earnings tended to work much longer hours than women
with lower earnings, they obviously were much more likely to experience
both some years of long hours and other years of short hours. 
An alternative way to analyze the change in variation in hours over 
a 10-year period is to trace movements in the coefficient of variation
(CVi) for both men and women. As expected, the estimates for men are
generally consistent with the HiLo estimates (see Table A7 in the
appendix). For prime-age men as a group, there is a 9.1 percent increase
in hours dispersion between the two decades, a slightly higher figure
than the 4.6 percent increase in the HiLo estimate. 
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mates do not yield the same rank orderings. For example, there is a much
l a rger interdecade growth for HiLo variance for white men than for
black men; the ordering is reversed for the CVi. Similarly, the larg e s t
growth in CVi hours dispersion is found in the lowest earnings quintile,
so this group had not only the highest level of interyear variance, but the
largest interdecade growth in dispersion.22
Among women, the interyear variance in hours worked is anywhere
f rom three to five times as great as for men. This reflects a statistical
quirk in this measure; the tendency of women to move in and out of the
labor force results in large variances around the mean. Thus among
women with strong employment continuity (those in the top earn i n g s
quintile), the CVi is not that different than men. Further, unlike men,
the variance declines sharply between the 1970s and the 1980s. Again,
this reflects the movement of women into the permanent full-time work-
f o rce—with fewer women spending years away from paid work. Given
that women still have primary responsibility for children and household
chores, this represents women’s increased responsibility to work a “sec-
ond shift,” contributing to the large increase in hours worked by two-
earner couples.
Taken together, the analysis of strong and weak job connection and
interyear variance in working time provides the strongest evidence yet of
the changing the nature of labor supply. As job stability has declined,
workers are doing everything they can to protect themselves from inter-
ruptions in their earnings. Working as much as they can when employ-
ment is available is one strategy that many workers and families have
a p p a rently adopted. Hence, as economic growth accelerates and jobs
become available, workers expand their hours of work to meet the
demand. Simply put, there is a good deal more supply out there than cur-
rent labor market statistics imply. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
We have traced changes in men’s, women’s, and family working time
since the late 1960s and considered how these changes have aff e c t e d
overall labor supply. The key point we have made is that conventional
m e a s u res of labor force participation and unemployment, which simply
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or more in a given week, are providing an increasingly inaccurate and
misleading gauge of available labor supply because they ignore the fact
that, with stagnating wages and increased job insecurity, incumbent
workers have increased their working time dramatically, adding substan-
tially to the total hours of labor that employers can draw upon. As a
result, falling unemployment rates do not necessarily mean that we are
“ running out of workers” and consequently face imminent wage-price
push inflation. Rather, we have an increasing labor supply that keeps a lid
on inflation and provides the human re s o u rces that can sustain faster eco-
nomic growth rates.
Tracing working time back to the late 1960s reveals a critical labor sup-
ply regime shift that occurred after the 1980–1982 recession. Between
1967 and 1982 average annual work hours declined significantly, by
about 135 hours per year per worker. After 1982 this trend reversed and
average hours began to increase. The upward trend since 1982 has been
nearly monotonic, with the exception of a slight dip during the
1990–1991 recession. By 1995 annual hours of work were back to their
1967 level. This increase in annual hours since 1982 is composed of both
an increase in weeks worked per worker and an increase in hours worked
per week. 
While there may be many factors that can explain the labor supply
regime shift, two seem to be of special importance: stagnation in average
wages and the growing feeling of job insecurity among workers in an era
of industrial re s t ructuring, downsizing, and mass layoffs. Stagnating
wages increase the need for families to work more hours to maintain liv-
ing standards; job insecurity motivates workers to work as many hours as
possible when jobs are available in anticipation of a time when they may
not be. Both factors lead to increasing individual work time, essentially,
a source of labor supply available to meet increases in labor demand.
The macroeconomic consequences of this shift in labor supply re g i m e
are striking. Before the shift falling unemployment rates appeared to lead
to wage-price pre s s u res and higher inflation, as we saw during the late
1970s. But since the shift the trade-off between unemployment and
inflation has become much more benign. By the 1990s the unemploy-
ment rate could fall to less than 5 percent without any hint of inflation.
Instead of widespread bottlenecks due to labor shortages, incumbent
workers have provided enough additional labor supply to fill the needs 
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under control.
These findings have a number of important policy implications relating
to such diverse concerns as promoting better labor market statistics,
reconsidering the potential for welfare recipients to find jobs in what is
described as a “tight” labor market, and cautioning the Federal Reserve
B o a rd against relying on official unemployment rates in the setting of
monetary policy.
Labor Market Statistics 
A natural concern is to have timely and accurate data to reflect the new
reality associated with the labor supply regime shift. This will re q u i re
paying more attention to a gamut of statistics, some of which are avail-
able but not published regularly and others that would need to be col-
lected. The Current Population Surv e y, fielded each month by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau, is the primary source
of data on labor force participation and unemployment. Once a year, in
M a rch, additional questions are added to the CPS, forming what is
known as the Annual Demographic File (ADF). This expanded survey
p rovides information on such matters as annual income and weeks
worked last year. Indeed, we used these data to compute many of the
charts in this policy brief.
Despite the wealth of information in the monthly CPS and the ADF, the
B u reau of Labor Statistics normally presents hours of work based on
employer surveys rather than on these household surveys. As a re s u l t ,
the monthly labor report often provides a mistaken view regarding work-
ing time. The number of hours worked per job can be going down based
on the employer surv e y, while the number of hours worked per worker
can be going up according to the household surv e y. Multiple-job and
self-employment hours are not reported in the employer surveys. Thus, if
an incumbent worker takes a second job and works 10 hours a week at it,
the average workweek reported in the employer surveys will actually go
down as the result of the added part-time job. On the other hand, based
on the CPS household surv e y, neither the number of workers in the
labor force nor the official unemployment rate will change, but total
hours of labor supply will increase. Since the monthly BLS report stresses
labor force participation, unemployment, and hours worked (per job),
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increase in real labor supply.
This immediate problem could be solved by having the BLS calculate
the average workweek from the CPS and re p o rt this along with the
employer survey working time data. But there is a bigger issue here. It
has to do with the change in the structure of work. With more people
working under part-time or part-year contingent contracts, with some
i n c rease in moonlighting, and with substantial increases in overtime 
(at least in manufacturing), the movement toward “nonstandard” 
workweeks and workyears is growing. Yet the standard statistics hard l y
measure this.
To remedy this problem, the CPS should be modestly expanded to col-
lect more complete information on a monthly basis on second (and
t h i rd) jobs, types of employment stru c t u re, and self-employment. These
data could be used to produce more accurate measures of true labor sup-
ply including changes in hours worked by incumbent workers.
Questions like those in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which
p robe about hours of work on multiple jobs, might provide a template
for such CPS questions. Asking about the last two years rather than just
one might shed some new light on labor market dynamics. The inter-
viewer could inquire, Have you experienced reduced hours over the past
month, year, or two years, and if so, why? Have you suff e red a re d u c t i o n
in your rate of pay?  Has another member of your family had re d u c e d
hours or a reduction in pay? A few questions could explore what work-
ers think is going to happen in the next six months; for example, Do
you foresee a reduction in earnings or hours? In addition to adding ques-
tions to the CPS and the ADF, undertaking longitudinal surveys could
help, since these can track the actual labor market participation of indi-
viduals over the business cycle and as they age.
We also should consider going back to collecting employer data on lay-
offs and quits, which was commonplace until the 1980s, but was discon-
tinued by the Reagan administration. Without this information we do
not have a good idea how many employment separations are due to the
v o l u n t a ry action of the employee or to an involuntary layoff by the
e m p l o y e r. These data would give us better information on which to
judge job stability and job security. 
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Proponents of welfare-to-work initiatives are optimistic that the current
strong economic conditions are a propitious moment for welfare mothers
to find jobs. Given that the economy is adding almost 2 million net new
jobs a year, they believe there are enough opportunities for even those
with the least skill and experience. While many opponents of these
plans have criticized their cost effectiveness (because of the expanded
need for child care and training), we feel that the plans may have a more
basic flaw—optimism about the prospects for welfare mothers may be
misplaced. Based on the re s e a rch re p o rted here, we do not think that
one can conclude from recent job growth and unemployment rates
below 5 percent that labor markets are so tight that new, unskilled
entrants can easily find employment.
Welfare mothers have never been a monolithic group and most are on
assistance for only a short period of time. Some have the requisite skills
to find jobs easily, especially when overall unemployment is as low as it
has recently been. But Educational Testing Service studies of welfare
recipients show that many have quite low proficiencies in core skills.23
Therefore, their success in obtaining employment is very much depen-
dent on employers’ being so pressed that they are willing to take chances
they ordinarily would not. Our view of the current labor markets is that
they are not as tight as many believe and employers will seek more work
from their experienced workers before resorting to new hires, especially
those with limited skills. Legislatures will have to revisit assistance 
programs in the near future as fewer than expected former recipients are
able to support themselves. 
M a c ro Policy
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the implication of our research
for macro policy in general and monetary policy in part i c u l a r. Because
official measures of unemployment can no longer be trusted as indicators
of overall labor market conditions, it would be prudent for the Federal
Reserve to pay little attention to them when it comes to setting short-
term interest rates or manipulating the money supply. To his credit, Fed
chairman Alan Greenspan seems to agree. Few economists have as broad
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value, as he. Accordingly, Greenspan has prevailed upon his colleagues
to keep interest rates unchanged even as the unemployment rate has
fallen well below a level once thought certain to be inflationary. His
understanding of how the rise in job insecurity and stagnating wages
affects labor supply is well worth heeding, as the analysis in this policy
brief suggests.  
Will the current climate of job insecurity, job instability, and stagnating
wages soon change? Are we on the verge, given low unemployment
rates, of re t u rning to the old labor market regime of declining average
workweeks and annual hours of work? We do not think so. The underly-
ing phenomena of global competition, technological change, weakened
unions, and industry deregulation give no sign of dissipating. As such, at
c u rrent sustainable economic growth rates, over the foreseeable future
one can expect a continued upward trend in hours, which will provide
the needed labor supply to keep inflation under control. These institu-
tional phenomena will there f o re accomplish much of what the Fed
might have done in the past to keep price increases in check. Indeed,
the Fed might even be able to relax short-term interest rates a bit in a
bid to increase growth rates without endangering price stability. 
There are, to be sure, often enormous personal, family, and community
costs as a result of the trend toward “overwork” in America. But, as we
have seen here, there is one substantial benefit—price stability at low
unemployment rates. If we can now reward hardworking Americans with
faster growth and the prospect of rising wage rates, the longer workweeks
will not have been totally in vain.
The Unmeasured Labor Forc e
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Table A2 Estimates of the Time Trend in Annual Hours Worked, 
Prime-Age Husband-Wife Couples, 1967–1988
Unemployment Adjusted
Time Trenda Rate Constant R2 N
All 34.2 –36.9 652.7 .969 21
(24.24) (7.10)
White 35.1 –37.2 591.7 .972 21
(25.3) (7.26)
Black 22.8 –31.8 1450.9 .831 21
(9.80) (3.68)
High school  24.5 –49.4 1317.5 .718 21
dropout (7.25) (4.12)
High school  33.0 –48.4 826.4 .924 21
graduate (15.41) (6.16)
Some college 32.6 –44.5 924.8 .766 21
(7.69) (4.36)
College graduate 36.4 –10.2 365.6 .958 21
(19.75) (1.61)
aChange per year in hours worked.
Note: Cochran-Orcutt transformed regression estimates; t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PSID data.
Table A1 Estimates of the Time Trend in Annual Hours Worked, 
Prime-Age Workers, 1967–1989
Unemployment Adjusted
Time Trenda Rate Constant R2 N
All 3.3 –20.7 1773.0 .659 22
(3.79) (6.37)
Men –2.6 –23.7 2599.9 .808 22
(2.97) (7.15)
Women 18.8 –8.7 55.3 .919 22
(15.50) (2.35)
White men –2.1 –23.3 2574.4 .773 22
(2.23) (6.62)
Black men –7.7 –33.0 2860.0 .863 22
(5.55) (5.80)
White women 20.5 –9.7 –86.8 .917 22
(15.31) (2.44)
Black women 10.7 –2.3 733.2 .435 22
(4.18) (0.79)
aChange per year in hours worked.
Note: Cochran-Orcutt transformed regression estimates: t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PSID data.
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Table A3  “Strong” Employment Continuity in the 1970s 







High school dropout 68 51
High school graduate 84 72
Some college 87 70







Source: Stephen J. Rose, “On Shaky Ground: Rising Fears about
Incomes and Earnings,” Research Report no. 94-02 (Washington,
D.C.: National Commission for Employment Policy, 1994).
Table A4 “Strong” and “Weak” Employment Continuity in the 1970s 
and 1980s, Women (percent)
Strong Weak
1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s
All 11 20 59 38
Race
White 10 20 61 39
Black 13 22 48 33
Education
High school dropout 8 13 65 56
High school graduate 12 22 60 38
Some college 15 25 56 35
College graduate 8 19 48 29
Marital status
Never married 29 35 33 20
Sometimes married 13 24 45 26
Always married 8 15 67 48
S o u rce: Stephen J. Rose, “On Shaky Ground: Rising Fears About Incomes and Earn i n g s , ”
R e p o rt no. 94-02 (Washington, D.C.: National Commission for Employment Policy, 1994).
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Table A6 HiLo Analysis of Hours Variance for Individual Workers, Men
Percent with HiLo Variancea Percent
1970s 1980s Difference
All 27.3 28.5 4.6
Race
White 26.2 27.9 6.4
Black 38.6 37.2 –3.4
Education
High school dropout 30.5 38.2 25.2
High school graduate 26.0 24.7 –4.9
Some college 31.3 28.6 –8.6
College graduate 22.2 26.6 19.5
10-year earnings quintile
Lowest 40.6 39.2 –3.5
Fourth 40.0 37.3 –6.0
Middle 23.5 28.6 21.5
Second 21.8 21.3 –2.4
Top 10.3 16.3 58.0
Number of years in which
changed employer
0–1 18.2 15.5 –15.2
2–3 35.9 33.6 –6.4
4+ 56.1 50.8 –9.4
aAt least one year > 2,400 hours and at least one year < 1,750 hours.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PSID data.
Table A5 Connection to Same Employer in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
Men (percent)
Weak Medium Strong
1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s
All 12 24 21 24 67 52
Race
White 12 23 21 25 67 52
Black 13 34 22 17 65 49
Education
High school dropout 14 39 23 20 63 41
High school graduate 10 20 21 21 68 60
Some college 12 25 21 28 67 47
College graduate 11 18 19 26 70 56
Note: “Strong” connection, having no more than 1 year out of 10 in which worker changed
employers; “medium” connection, having 2 to 3 years out of 10 in which worker changed
employers; “weak” connection, having 4 or more years out of 10 in which worker changed
employers.
S o u rce: Stephen J. Rose, “Declining Job Security and the Professionalization of Opport u n i t y, ”
Research Report no. 95-04 (Washington, D.C.: National Commission for Employment
Policy, 1995).
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Table A7 CVi Analysis of Hours Variance for Individual Workers, 
by Gender
Men Women
CVi CVi  Percent Percent
1970s 1980s Change 1970s 1980s Change
All .22 .24 9.1 1.02 .67 –34.3
Race
White .22 .23 4.5 1.05 .68 –35.2
Black .28 .36 28.6 .90 .60 –33.3
Education
High school dropout .30 .34 13.3 1.14 .96 –15.8
High school graduate .21 .24 14.3 1.04 .67 –35.6
Some college .18 .25 38.9 .98 .56 –42.9
College graduate .17 .17 0.0 .79 .56 –29.1
10-year earnings quintile
Lowest .45 .54 20.0 2.29 1.72 –24.9
Fourth .21 .20 –4.8 1.39 .78 –43.9
Middle .17 .17 0.0 .79 .43 –45.6
Second .15 .14 –6.7 .41 .25 –39.0
Top .13 .14 7.7 .24 .18 –0.25
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PSID data.
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N o t e s
1. For example, in the year ending in May 1997, producer prices for heavy trucks
were down 4.5 percent, for glass containers down 2.9 percent, and for photo-
graphic equipment down 2.3 percent; major consumerg o ods from household
appliances to toys and cosmetics saw consumer price declines ranging from 1.0
to 2.2 percent (Mandel 1997a).
2. One might also note that the recent decline in the rate of health care infla-
tion has itself had an ancillary impact on overall prices by reducing the rate at
which the cost of employee benefits has been rising throughout the economy.
After increasing in real terms by better than 2 percent a year earlier in the
decade, average benefit costs actually declined in 1995 and again in 1996,
reining in overall employment cost increases despite tighter labor markets
(Bernstein 1996).
3. Soon after the jobless rate first slipped below 6.0 percent in 1994, the Fed
raised short-term interest rates a quarter point and followed this up with five
more rate hikes in quick succession, deliberately trying to slow the economy.
The Fed action “worked.” Although inflation never did appear as a problem,
the higher interest rates slowed the GDP growth rate from 3.5 percent in 1994
to just 2.0 percent in 1995. More recently, in March of 1997, the Fed raised
the federal funds rate (the interest rate member banks charge for overn i g h t
loans) soon after the BLS announced that the unemployment rate had fallen
to 5.2 percent. And, again, in April 1997, only days after the BLS announced
that the unemployment rate had fallen under 5.0 percent, Alan Gre e n s p a n
was publicly warning of labor markets that seemed to have become too tight
for the good of the economy. Speaking at New York University, he noted,
“While there is scant evidence of any imminent resurgence of inflation at the
moment, there also appears to be little slack in our capacity to prod u c e ”
(quoted in Schlesinger, 1997). That the Fed was considering raising interest
rates again purposefully to slow the economy was clear from his re m a r k s .
P re s u m a b l y, Greenspan was judging that at such low unemployment rates,
feelings of job insecurity surely had to be evaporating. 
4. This analysis was carried out by decomposing the changes in total hours of
work according to the following formulas.
Added hours to changes in population growth:
POP(t–(t–1) ) x LFPRt–1 x (1 – URt–1) x (hrs/worker)t–1
Added hours due to changes in the labor force participation rate: 
LFPR(t–(t–1)) x POPt–1 x (1 – URt–1 ) x (hrs/worker)t–1
Added hours due to changes in the unemployment rate: 
(1 – UR)(t–(t–1)) x POPt–1 x LFPRt–1 x (hrs/worker)t–1
Added hours due to changes in hours worked per worker: 
(hrs/worker)(t–(t–1)) x POPt–1 x LFPRt–1 x (1 – URt–1 )
where: POP = civilian noninstitutional population
LFPR = labor force participation rate
UR     = unemployment rate
hrs/worker = average annual hours worked per worker
5. The textbook example is the worker who wins millions of dollars in a state lot-
tery. His or her wage remains unchanged, but income rises significantly. Often,
such a prizewinner will choose to cut back on work hours, at least temporarily.
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6. A c c o rding to a recent survey by The Economist, Americans have now surpassed even
the Japanese in annual work time and toil 15 percent longer than the typical Germ a n .
See “Workaholics Anonymous: Why Do Americans Work So Hard?” The Economist,
October 22, 1994, p. 20. 
7 . An analysis of Current Population Survey data by the Economic Policy
Institute and the Wo m e n ’s Research and Education Institute indicates that in
1995 there were over 34 million part-time, temporary, and contract workers in
the United States—29.4 percent of the total workforce (Spalter-Roth et al.
1997). Of these, 16 million workers (14 percent of the labor force) were part -
timers, working 35 hours or less per week. Smaller in absolute numbers, but
g rowing much faster, is the temporary workforce, which between 1982 and
1996 more than quadrupled to 2 million workers. The number of contract and
self-employed workers is also growing rapidly. In a re p o rt completed in 1991 on
data for 1985 through 1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office re p o rted that
the number of individuals who were self-employed or working under personal
contract was growing at over 13 percent a year (as measured by IRS Form 1099
submissions) (U.S. General Accounting Office 1991). In 1995, 13 million
Americans worked for themselves either full-time or as a supplement to re g u l a r
or part-time employment.
8.Similar time diary studies were carried out in the mid 1960s in a number of
other countries (Szalai et al. 1972).
9 . This result is almost identical to the 1979 to 1989 increase re p o rted by
Mishel and Bernstein (1994, Table 3.1, 112). Using the CPS, they find an
82-hour increase in annual hours compared to our 79.
10. Because of autocorrelation, these re g ressions were run using the Cochran-
O rcutt transformation. OLS re g ressions for the groups re p o rted in Table 2
generated Durbin-Watson statistics that ranged from .89 (white female
regression) to 1.62 (black male regression). 
11. Robinson-Bostro m ’s diary estimates for men for 1965 and 1985 are 47.1
and46.4 weekly hours, respectively. Multiplying the difference between these
two estimates by 52 yields 36.4 annual hours.
12. In 1989 the average white unemployment rate was 4.5 percent and the black
rate was 11.4 percent. On average, then, whites experienced (52 x 0.045 x
40) = 93.6 hours a year of lost work due to unemployment. By the same cal-
culation, blacks experienced 237 hours of lost work. The diff e rence (143.4
hours) accounts for just 41 percent (143/350) of the diff e rence in annual
hours between white and black men. The re m a i n d e r, approximately 210
hours, must be due to shorter workweeks, with black men working roughly 4
hours per week less than white men after accounting for differences in unem-
ployment.
13. This analysis is limited to intact husband-wife families in which the husband
is “prime age” (age 25–54) and in which both husband and wife worked at
least one hour in the survey year.
14. Because of incomplete family hours and earnings data for 1989 in the PSID
we used for conducting this study, the following analysis is done for the
period ending in 1988.
15. The year 1973 was chosen as the base year for this analysis because that year-
represents the end of the postwar boom in real average hourly wages.
May 98 PPB No.40  2/18/99  2:15 PM  Page 56The Growth in Work Hours
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 57
1 6 . This was necessary because our version of the PSID contains data only
through 1989.
17. It should be noted that total hours worked is derived differently in the CPS
and in the PSID. In the CPS total hours equals usual weekly hours multiplied
by the number of weeks worked, with paid vacations and sick time included
as working weeks. By contrast, the PSID tracks actual hours worked exclud-
ing time off for vacations and illness. Thus, the PSID annual hours worked
variable is computed by adding usual hours worked per week times actual
weeks worked plus overtime hours plus working time on second and third
jobs. It seems that the hours lost in the PSID by not counting vacation and
sick time as part of working time are almost exactly offset by the added hours
due to overtime and moonlighting.
18. In these concatenated analyses, hours estimates for 1967 to 1974 are fro m
the PSID and those from 1975 through 1995 are from the CPS. 
1 9 . Age composition affects estimates of average working time because of the
reduced hours put in by both younger workers and older workers. Yo u n g e r
workers are more likely to mix work with school and therefore a larger pro-
p o rtion will be working part-time hours. As workers approach re t i re m e n t
years, they are likely to cut back hours, also affecting overall hours estimates.
Therefore, as the age profile of the working population changes, there will
naturally be a change in hours worked unrelated to changes in labor supply
regime. By measuring the labor supply of prime-age workers, we held the
demographic profile fixed over the time series we investigated.
20. This value was calculated by weighting the 1995 weekly hours for each edu-
cation group by the 1975 share of the workforce in each of these education
groups. The difference between the actual 1995 weekly hours estimate and
this 1975 education-weighted 1995 weekly hours estimate was then divided
by the actual weekly hours increase between 1975 and 1995. This yields the
percentage associated with increased education level (80.8 percent).
2 1 . One might also note that Table A7 indicates the racial diff e rence among
prime-age women in labor force continuity is the reverse of that for men. In
both the 1970s and the 1980s black women have both higher levels of strong
continuity and lower levels of weak continuity to the labor market—
although both gaps are closing. In general, more-educated women have
stronger continuity as expected, with the one anomaly being the drop off in
continuity among college-educated women At this point, we do not have a
good explanation for this finding. It is possible that this may reflect a contin-
gent of better-educated women who have gone back to school during their
“prime working years” to complete additional education. Another possibility
is that this reflects delayed childbearing among college-educated women and
therefore more part-time employment in the early prime working years.
22. This particular result suggests why the two measures of dispersion can yield
different outcomes. It is possible that workers in the lowest earnings quintile
could have a low pro p o rtion of HiLo variance because few of them ever
worked more than 2,400 hours. However, if variance below 2,400 hours were
to increase, the coefficient of variation could be substantial and tre n d
upward.
23. See Barton and Jenkins (1995); see also Carnevale and Desrochers (1998).
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